The Theory and Practice of ‘Theory and Practice’ in Art and Design HE

17 May 2017Red RoomChelsea College of Arts John Islip Street
SW1P 4JU
9.30am to 4.30pm
Overview
This teaching platform will look beyond the simple binaries between theory and practice and put into focus the evolving pedagogical relationships between these two different yet intertwined disciplines.

It seeks to be inclusive of current theories and practices that relate theory and practice. It aims to question contemporary theories and practices, which support ‘theory and practice’ in Art and Design undergraduate courses in the UK.

T&L Day 10th May: LCC Teaching Scholar: Thinking Design Tickets, Wed, 10 May 2017 at 13:30 | Eventbrite

https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/tl-day-10th-may-lcc-teaching-scholar-thinking-design-tickets-34065488794

REGISTER DATE AND TIME

Wed 10 May 2017
13:30 – 14:50 BST

LOCATION

LCC: T1104

Mark Ingham
Thinking Design
The ‘Thinking Design’ project is about how we think about design, how we design thinking and about design as

The Theory and Practice of ‘Theory and Practice’ in Art and Design HE

17 May 2017

9.30am to 4.30pm

Location:

Red Room

Chelsea College of Arts John Islip Street

SW1P 4JU

View in map

Event Status:

Open

Event Contact:

Teachingexchange@arts.ac.uk

Overview
This teaching platform will look beyond the simple binaries between theory and practice and put into focus the evolving pedagogical relationships between these two different yet intertwined disciplines.

It seeks to be inclusive of current theories and practices that relate theory and practice. It aims to question contemporary theories and practices, which support ‘theory and practice’ in Art and Design undergraduate courses in the UK.

The conference will consider the long and complex history of the ways in which theory and practice has been taught on arts undergraduate courses in the UK. From the Coldstream Reports in 1969/70 with the introduction of Art History and Complementary studies on an undergraduate degree in Art and Design and the subsequent developments in Critical Theory, Cultural Studies, Complimentary and Contextual Studies.

As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1990 p2) argues, “Since practice is an irreducible theoretical moment, no practice takes place without presupposing itself as a example of a more or less powerful theory,” then can we now see the possibility of there being no difference between theory and practice being the future of the pedagogies of theory and practice in UK undergraduate courses?

The conference will reflect on how different writing practices support the relationships between theory and practice in contemporary Arts education. As this education, now contextualised within the massification of the University sector, involves preparing students for the world beyond university, we ask how can these writing practices support this preparation?

What will I learn?
This teaching platform will offer an opportunity for art and design educators to explore some of the historical and evolving relationships that theory has with practice and practice has with theory.

Themes covered by the day will include: writing practices; the possibilities of being no difference between theory and practice; the future of the relationships between theory and practice in UK undergraduate courses; curriculum models and pedagogies that most effectively support the integration of theory and practice.

Who should attend?
This event is open to academics, technicians, support tutors and librarians who have an interest in the relationships between practice and theory.

Spivak, G. C., Harasym, S. (ed) (1990) The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues. Routledge. New York & London

Draft Programme (subject to change)

0930-1000 Registration and Coffee
1000-1010 Introductions – Prof Susan Orr, David Webster
1010-1110 Workshop with Dr Mark Ingham
1110-1130 Refreshments and Networking
1130-1220 Keynote with Dr Julia Lockheart
1230-1320 Lunch
1320-1420 Roundtable discussion
1420-1500 Degrees of Separation – Alumni Presentation & workshop
Carlotta Solari and Michel Erler
1500-1530 Refreshments
1530-1615 Future Theory:
Craig Burston
Katharine Dwyer
1615-1630 Plenary

Speaker Biographies

Craig Burston is Course Leader on BA (Hons) Graphic and Media Design at London College of Communication.  His teaching emphasis focuses on the practical testing and application of semiotic theory, the interplay between analogue and digital media and the impact of new technologies upon aesthetics.  Craig’s ongoing practice based research explores the relationship between iconic representation, memory and communication and has manifested itself through a range of output including audio-visual collaborations, gallery installations, research seminars and comic strips.  With photographer and digital media artist Richard Tomlinson, Craig is also the co-founder of skip-rat designs, latterly skipratmedia. Twitter: @skipratmedia

Katharine Dwyer spent a decade working in a corporate environment before returning to study Fine Art at UAL. Katharine completed her Master of Fine Art (MFA) at Wimbledon College of Arts in 2016. Her art pratice explores languages of authority, both personal and institutional, which are used to manufacture consent in the modern workplace. Twitter @tumble33

Dr. Mark Ingham is the Contextual and Theoretical Studies Coordinator at London College of Communication.  Mark is a fine artist who uses old SLR film cameras and LED lights to create multiple slide projectors in large scale art installations. His art and design research includes, relationships between autobiographical memory and photography, Gilles Deleuze’s and Felix Guattari’s ideas of ‘Becoming Rhizomatic’. His pedagogical research into the relationships between theory and practice and their roles in art and design disciplines has made him acutely aware of the importance of an holistic approach to teaching. He used his knowledge of making and doing skills, including design and multimedia software, in combination with his practical and theoretical knowledge to give students a full and rounded educational experience. Twitter: @malarkeypalaver

Dr Julia Lockheart is the director of the Writing-PAD project and co-editor, with Professor John Wood, of the Journal of Writing in Creative Practice. She has studied both Fine Art and TESOL to MA level and is also qualified to teach adults with SpLDs (Dyslexia).  Julia has a PhD in Design from Goldsmiths, University of London.  Her research focussed on developing tools for co-writing in design teams.  She has presented and published both nationally and internationally. Twitter: @jollyjewels

Prof Susan Orr is Dean: Learning, Teaching and Enhancement at University of the Arts London. Susan has written extensively on the subject of art and design assessment and her more recent work explores various aspects of art and design pedagogy in higher education. Susan is editor for the journal Art, Design and Communication in Higher Education, and on the editorial board of three further journals.  Susan is on the Executive of CHEAD (Council for Higher Education in Art and Design) and GLAD (Group for Learning in Art and Design). In 2010, Susan was awarded a Higher Education Academy National Teaching Fellowship. This was awarded in recognition of her teaching, leadership, research and contribution to art and design HE pedagogy. Twitter: @Susan_K_Orr

Carlotta Solari is multidisciplinary designer and artist, and Michel Erler is a designer and researcher. Both are recent graduates from BA (Hons) Interaction Design Arts at London College of Communication (UAL). Twitter @SolariTotti @MichelErler

David Webster is Associate Dean: Learning, Teaching and Enhancement for Camberwell, Chelsea and Wimbledon Colleges at University of the Arts London.
Twitter @webster858

Teaching Platform Series 
This event is part of a series hosted by University of the Arts London, exploring key issues in Arts teaching and learning in higher education. Each event includes leading speakers sharing current thinking in creative education and is designed to be interactive: delegates will have opportunities to engage in activities to support networking and engagement.

For more information about Teaching and Learning at UAL visit the Exchange website.  To subscribe to our mailing list for more details about these and other events, please email teachingexchange@arts.ac.uk, or follow us on Twitter @UALTLE.

 

‘THREE QUESTIONS ON SIX TIMES TWO’ – ONscenes

http://www.onscenes.com/film/three-questions-on-six-times-two

THREE QUESTIONS ON SIX TIMES TWO’

4/3/2017 0 Comments

interview with ​​Gilles Deleuze
Picture

Cahiers du Cinema has asked you for an interview, because you’re a “Philosopher” and we wanted to do something philosophical, but more specifically because you like and admire Godard s work. What do you think of his recent TV programs?
​Like many people, I was moved, and it’s a lasting emotion. Maybe I should explain my image of Godard. As someone who works a great deal, he must be a very solitary figure. But it’s not just any solitude, it’s an extra ordinarily animated solitude. Full, not of dreams, fantasies, and projects, but of acts, things, people even. A multiple, creative solitude. From the depths of this solitude Godard constitutes a force in his own right but also gets others to work as a team. He can deal as an equal with anyone, with official powers or organizations, as well as a cleaning lady, a worker, mad people. In the TV programs, Godard’s questions always engage people directly. They disorient us, the viewers, but not whoever he’s talking to. He talks to crazy people in a way that’s no more that of a psychiatrist than of another madman, or of someone “playing the fool.” He talks with workers not as a boss, or another worker, or an intellectual, or a director talking with actors. It’s nothing to do with adopting their tone, in a wily sort of way, it’s because his solitude gives him a great capacity, is so full. It’s as though, in a way, he’s always stammering. Not stammering in his words, but stammering in language itself. You can normally only be a foreigner in another language. But here it’s a case of being a foreigner in one’s own language. Proust said that fine books have to be written in a sort offoreign language. It’s the same with Godard’s programs; he’s even perfected his Swiss accent to precisely this effect. It’s this creative stammering, this solitude, which makes Godard a force.
Because, as you know better than I do, he’s always been alone. Godard’s never had any popular success with his films, as those who say “he’s changed, from such and such a point onward it’s no good” would have us believe. They’re often the very people who initially hated him. Godard was ahead of, and influenced, everyone, but not by being a success, rather by following his own line, a line of active flight, a repeatedly broken line zigzagging beneath the surface. Anyway,in cinema, they more or less managed to lock him into his solitude. They pinned him down. And now he’s used the opportunity presented by the holidays, and a vague demand for creativity,to take over the TVfor six times two programs. It may be the sole case of someone not being duped byTV.You’ve usually lost from the outset. People wouldn’t have minded him promoting his films, but they can’t forgive him for making this series that changes so many things at the heart of TV (questioning people, making them talk, showing images from a variety of sources, and so on). Even now it’s over, even if it’s been stifled. Many groups and associations were bound to get annoyed: the statement from the Union of Photographic Journalists and Cameramen is a good example. Godard has at the very least stirred up hatred. But he’s also shown that a differently “animated” TV is possible.

You haven’t answered our question. Say you had to give a “course” on these programs. . . What ideas did you see, or sense in them? How would you try to explain your enthusiasm? We can always talk about everything elseafterward, even ifit’s what’s most important.
OK, but ideas, having an idea, isn’t about ideology, it’s a practical matter. Godard has a nice saying: not a just image, just an image. Philosophers ought also to say ” not the just ideas, just ideas” and bear this out in their activity. Because the just ideas are always those that conform to accepted meanings or established precepts, they’re always ideas that confirm something, even if it’s something in the future, even if it’s the future of the revolution. While “just ideas” is a becoming-present, a stammering of ideas, and can only be expressed in the form of questions that tend to confound any answers. Or you can present some simple thing that disrupts all the arguments.
There are two ideas in Godard’s programs that work this way,constantly encroaching on one another, getting mixed up and teased apart bit by bit. This is one reason why each program has two parts: as at primary school there are the two elements oflearning about things and learning about language. The first idea is to do with work. I think Godard’s constantly bringing into question a vaguely Marxist scheme that has spread everywhere: there’s supposed to be something pretty abstract called “labor” that one can buy or sell, in situations that either mark a basic social injustice or establish a little more socialjustice. But Godard asks very concrete questions, he presents images touching on what exactly is being bought and sold. What are some people prepared to buy, and others to sell, these not necessarily being the same thing? A young welder is prepared to sell his work as a welder, but not his sexuality by becoming an old woman’s lover. A cleaning lady’s happy to sell the time she spends cleaning but won’t sell the moment she spends singing a bit of the “Internationale” why? Because she can’t sing? But what, then, if one were to pay her for talking about not being able to sing? A specialist clockmaker, on the other hand, wants to get paid for his clockmaking efforts, but refuses to be paid for his work as an amateur filmmaker, which he calls his “hobby”; but the images show that the movements he makes in the two activities, the clockmaking sequence and the editing sequence, are so remarkably similar that you can mistake one for the other. But no, saysthe clockmaker, there’s a great difference oflove and warmth in these movements, I don’t want to be paid for my filmmaking. But then what about filmmakers and photographers who do get paid? What, furthermore, is a photographer himself prepared to pay for? He’s sometimes prepared to pay his model. Sometimes the model pays him. But when he photographs torture or an execution, he pays neither the victim nor the executioner. And when he photographs children who are sick, wounded, or hungry, why doesn’t he pay them? Guattari once suggested at a psychoanalytical congress that analysands should be paid as well as analysts, since the analyst isn’t exactly providing a “service,” it’s more like a division of labor, two distinct kinds of work going on: there’s the analyst’s work of listening and sifting, but the analysand’s unconscious is at work too. Nobody seems to have taken much notice of Guattari’s suggestion. Godard’s saying the same thing: why not pay the people who watch television, instead of making them pay, because they’re engaged in real work and are themselves providing a public service? The social division of labor means it’s not only work on the shop floor that gets paid but work in offices and research laboratories too. Otherwise we’d have to think about the workers themselves having to pay the people who design the things they make. I think all these questions and many others, all these images and many others, tear apart the notion of labor. In the first place, the very notion of labor arbitrarily sets one area of activity apart, cuts work off from its relation to love, to creativity, to production even. It makes work a kind of maintenance, the opposite of creating anything, because on this notion it’s a matter of reproducing goods that are consumed and reproducing its own productive force, within a closed system of exchange. From this view point it doesn’t much matter whether the exchange is fair or unfair, because there’s always selective violence in an act of payment, and there’s mystification in the very principle of talking in terms oflabor. It’s to the extent that work might be distinguished from the productive pseudoforce of labor that very different flows of production, of many disparate kinds, might be brought into direct relation with flows of money, independently of any mediation by an abstract force. I’m even more confused than Godard. Just as I should be, since the key thing is the questions Godard asks and the images he presents and a chance of the spectator feeling that the notion of labor isn’t innocent, isn’t at all obvious-even, and particularly, from the viewpoint of social criticism. It’s this, quite as much as the more obvious things, that explains the reactions of the Communist Party and some unions to Godard’s programs: he’s dared to question that sacrosanct notion of labor. . .
And then there’s the second idea, to do with information. Because here again, language is presented to us as basically informative, and information as basically an exchange. Once again, information is measured in abstract units. But it’s doubtful whether the schoolmistress, explaining how something works or teaching spelling, is transmitting information. She’s instructing, she’s really delivering precepts. And ​children are supplied with syntax like workers being given tools, in order to produce utterances conforming to accepted meanings. We should take him quite literally when Godard sayschildren are political prisoners. Language is a system of instructions rather than a means of conveying information. TV tells us: “Now we’ll have a bit of entertainment, then the news. . . ” We ought in fact to invert the scheme of information theory. The theory assumes a theoretical maximum of information, with pure noise, interference, at the other extreme; and in between there’s redundancy, which reduces the information but allows it to overcome noise. But we should actually start with redundancy as the transmission and relaying of orders or instructions; next, there’s information-always the minimum needed for the satisfactory reception of orders; then what? Well, then there’s something like silence, or like stammering, or screaming, something slipping through underneath the redundancies and information, letting language slip through, and making itself heard, in spite of everything. To talk, even about yourself, is always to take the place of someone else in whose place you’re claiming to speak and who’s been denied the right to speak. Orders and precepts stream from seguy’s open mouth.2 But the woman with the dead child is open-mouthed too. An image gets represented by a sound, like a worker by his representative. A sound takes over a series of images. So how can we manage to speak without giving orders, without claiming to represent something or someone, how can we get people without the right to speak, to speak; and how can we restore to sounds their part in the struggle against power? I suppose that’s what it means to be like a foreigner in one’s own language, to trace a sort of line of flight for words.

That’s “just” two ideas, but two ideas is a lot, it’s massive, includes loads of things and other ideas. So Godard brings into question two everyday notions, those of labor and information. He doesn’t saywe should give true information, nor that labor should be weUpaid (those would be the just ideas). He says these notions are very suspect. He writes FALSE beside them. He’s been saying for ages that he’d like to be a production company rather than an auteur, and to run the television news rather than make films. He didn’t of course mean he wanted to produce his own films, like Verneuil, or take over TV. But that he wanted to produce a mosaic of different work rather than measuring it all against some abstract productive force, and wanted to produce a sub-informational juxtaposition of all the open mouths instead of relating them all to some abstract information taken as a precept.

If those are Godard’s two ideas, do they correspond to the theme of “sounds and images” that constantly recurs in the programs? Images-learning from things-relating to work, and sounds-learning the language-relating to information?
No, there’s only a partial correspondence: there’s always information in images, and something at work in sounds. Any set of terms can and should be divided up in various ways that correspond only partially. To try and articulate the relation between sounds and images as Godard understands it you’d have to tell a very abstract story, in several episodes, and then finally see that this abstract story corresponds to a single episode of something terribly simple and concrete.
1.There are images, things are themselves images, because images aren’t in our head, in our brain. The brain’s just one image among others. Images are constantly acting and reacting on each other, producing and consuming. There’s no difference at all between images, things, and motion.

2. But images also have an insideor certain images have an inside and are experienced from inside. They’re subjects (Godard’s remarks on Two or Three Things I Know About Her in Godard on Godard, pp. 239-42). And there’s a gapbetween actions upon these images and the reactions they produce. It’s this gap that enables them to store up other images, that is to perceive. But what they store is only what interests them in other images: perceiving issubtracting from an image what doesn’t interest us, there’s alwayslessin our perception. We’re so full of images we no longer see those outside us for what they are.

3. There are also aural images, which don’t seem to have any priority. Yet these aural images, or some of them, have an otherside you can call whatever you like, ideas, meaning, language, expressive aspects, and so on. Aural images are thus able to contract or capture other images or a series of other images. A voice takes over a set of images (the voice of Hitler, say). Ideas, acting as precepts, are embodied in aural images or sound waves and saywhat should interest us in ​other images: they dictate our perception. There’s always a central “rubber stamp” normalizing images, subtracting what we’re not supposed to see. So, given the earlier gap, we can trace out as it were two converse currents: one going from external images to perceptions, the other going from prevailing ideas to perceptions.
4. So we’re caught in a chain of images, each of us in our own particular place, each ourself an image, and also in a network of ideas acting as precepts. And so what Godard’s doing with his “words and images” goes in two directions at once. On the one hand he’s restoring their fullness to external images, so we don’t perceive something less, making perception equal to the image, giving back to images all that belongs to them-which is in itself a way of challenging this or that power and its rubber stamps. On the other hand, he’s undoing the way language takes power, he’s making it stammer in sound waves, taking apart any set of ideas purporting to be just ones and extracting from it just some ideas. These are perhaps two reasons among others why Godard makes such novel use of the staticshot. It’ s rather like what some contemporary musicians do by introducing a fixed aural plane so that everything in music is heard. And when Godard puts a blackboard on the screen and writes on it, he’s not making it something he can film but making the blackboard and writing into a new televisual resource, a sort of expressive material with its own particular current in relation to the other currents on the screen.

This whole abstract story in four episodes sounds a bit like science fiction. But it’s our social reality these days. The strange thing is that the story corresponds in various ways to what Bergson said in the first chapter of Matter and Memory. Bergson’s seen as a sedate old philosopher who’s no longer of any interest. It would be good if cinema or television revived interest in him (he should be on the IDHEC syllabus, maybe he is). The first chapter of Matter and Memory develops an amazing conception of the relations between photography and cinematic motion, and things: “photography, if there is such a thing as photography, is caught from the outset in, drawn from the start right into the interior of things, and this at every point in space,” and so on. That’s not to say Godard’s a Bergsonian. It’s more the other way around; Godard’s not even reviving Bergson, but finding bits of Bergson along his way as he revivifies television.

But why does everything in Godard come in twos? You need two toget three. . . Fine, but what are these twos and threes all about ?
Oh, come on, you know better than anyone it’s not like that. Godard’s not a dialectician. What counts with him isn’t two or three or however many, it’s AND, the conjunction AND. The key thing is Godard’s use of AND. This is important, because all our thought’s modeled, rather, on the verb “to be,” IS. Philosophy’s weighed down with discussions about attributive judgments (the sky is blue) and existential judgments (God is) and the possibility or impossibility of reducing one to the other. But they all turn on the verb “to be.” Even conjunctions are dealt with in terms of the verb “to be”-look at syllogisms. The English and the Americans are just about the only people who’ve set conjunctions free, by thinking about relations. But when you see relational judgments as autonomous, you realize that they creep in everywhere, they invade and ruin everything: AND isn’t even a specific conjunction or relation, it brings in all relations, there are as many relations as ANDS, AND doesn’t just upset all relations, it upsets being, the verb. . . and so on. AND, “and. . . and . . . and . . . “is precisely a creative stammering, a foreign use of language, as opposed to a conformist and dominant use based on the verb “to be.”
AND is of course diversity, multiplicity, the destruction of identities. It’s not the same factory gate when I go in, and when I come out, and then when I go past unemployed. A convicted man’s wife isn’t the same before and after the conviction. But diversity and multiplicity are nothing to do with aesthetic wholes (in the sense of “one more,” “one more woman” …) or dialectical schemas (in the sense of “one produces two, which then produces three”). Because in those cases it’s still Unity, and thus being, that’s primary, and that supposedly becomes multiple. When Godard says everything has two parts, that in a day there’s morning and evening, he’s not saying it’s one or the other, or that one becomes the other, becomes two. Because multiplicity is never in the terms, however many, nor in all the terms together, the whole. Multiplicity is precisely in the “and,” which is different in nature from elementary components and collections of them.

Neither a component nor a collection, what is this AND? I think Godard’s force lies in living and thinking and presenting this AND in a very novel way, and in making it work actively. AND is neither one thing nor the other, it’s always in between, between two things; it’s the borderline, there’s always a border, a line of flight or flow, only we don’t see it, because it’s the least perceptible of things. And yet it’s along this line of flight that things come to pass, becomings evolve, revolutions take shape. ”The strong people aren’t the ones on one side or the other, power lies on the border.” Giscard d’Estaing made a sad observation in the lecture on military geography he recently gave the army: the more that things become balanced at the level of the largest groups, between West and East, U.S.A. and USSR, with planetary consensus, link-ups in space, global policing, and so on, the more they become “destabilized” between North and South-Giscard cites Angola, the Near East, the Palestinian resistance, but also all the unrest that produces “a regional destabilization of security,” airplane hijacking, Corsica. . . Between North and South we’ll keep on finding lines that derail the big groups, an AND, AND, AND which each time marks a new threshold, a new direction of the broken line, a new course for the border. Godard’s trying to “see borders,” that is, to show the imperceptible. The convict and his wife. The mother and child. But also images and sounds. And the clockmaker’s movements when he’s in his clockmaking sequence and when he’s at his editing table: an imperceptible border separates them, belonging to neither but carrying both forward in their disparate development, in a flight or in a flow where we no longer know which is the guiding thread, nor where it’s going. A whole micropolitics of borders, countering the macropolitics of large groups. At least we know that’s where things come to pass, on the border between images and sounds, where images become too full and sounds too strident. That’s what Godard’s done in Six Times Two: made this active and creative line pass six times between them, made it visible, as it carries television forward.
Cahiers du Cinema271 (November 1976)
Deleuze, Gilles, Negotiations, 1972-1990 / part two CINEMAS/Gilles Deleuze : translated by Martin Joughin.
Columbia University Press New York Chichester, West Sussex
Pourparlers @ 1990 by Les Editions de Minuit Translation copyright@ 1995 Columbia University Press

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‘Intellectuals and power’: A conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze

Intellectuals and power’: A conversation between Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze – ONscenes

http://www.onscenes.com/philosophy/intellectuals-and-power-a-conversation-between-michel-foucault-and-gilles-deleuze

This is a transcript of a 1972 conversation between the post-structuralist philosophers Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, which discusses the links between the struggles of women, homosexuals, prisoners etc.. to class struggle, and also the relationship between theory, practice and power.
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​This transcript first appeared in English in the book ‘Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: selected essays and interviews by Michel Foucault’ / edited by Donald F. Bouchard
MICHEL FOUCAULT: A Maoist once said to me: “I can easily understand Sartre’s purpose in siding with us; I can understand his goals and his involvement in politics; I can partially understand your position since you’ve always been concerned with the problem of confinement. But Deleuze is an enigma.” I was shocked by this statement because your position has always seemed particularly clear to me.
​GILLES DELEUZE: Possibly we’re in the process of experiencing a new relationship between theory and practice. At one time, practice was considered an application of theory, a consequence; at other times, it bad an opposite sense and it was thought to inspire theory, to be indispensable for the creation of future theoretical forms. In any event, their relationship was understood in terms of a process of utilisation. For us, however, the question is seen in a differentlight. The relationships between theory and practice are far more partial and fragmentary. on one side, a theory is always local and related to a limited field, and it is applied in another sphere, more or less distant from it. The relationship which holds in the application of a theory is never one of resemblance. Moreover, from the moment theory moves into its proper domain, it begins to encounter obstacles, walls, and blockages which require its relay by another type of discourse (it is through this other discourse that it eventually passes to a different domain). Practice is a set of relays from one theoretical point to another, and theory is a relay from one practice to another. No theory can develop without eventually encountering a wall and practice is necessary for piercing this wall. For example, your work began in the theoretical analysis of the context of confinement, specifically with respect to the psychiatric asylum within a capitalist society in the nineteenth century. Then you became aware of the necessity for confined individuals to speak for themselves, to create a relay (it’s possible, on the contrary, that your function was already that of a relay in relation to them); and this group is found in prisons — these individuals are imprisoned. It was on this basis that You organised the information group for prisons (G.I.P.)(1), the object being to create conditions that permit the prisoners themselves to speak. It would be absolutely false to say, as the Maoist implied, that in moving to this practice you were applying your theories. This was not an application; nor was it a project for initiating reforms or an enquiry in a traditional sense. The emphasis was altogether different: a system of relays within a larger sphere, within a multiplicity or parts that are both theoretical and practical. A theorising intellectual, for us, is no longer a subject, a representing or representative consciousness. Those who act and struggle are no longer represented, either by a group or a union that appropriates the right to stand as their conscience. Who speaks and acts? It is always a multiplicity, even with in the person who speaks and acts. All of us are “groupuscules.”(2) Representation no longer exists; there are only action-theoretical action and practical action which serve as relays and form networks.

FOUCAULT: It seems to me that the political involvement of the intellectual was traditionally the product of two different aspects of his activity: his position as an intellectual in bourgeois society, in the system of capitalist production and within the ideology it produces or imposes (his exploitation, poverty, rejection, persecution, the accusations of subversive activity, immorality, etc); and his proper discourse to the extent that it revealed a particular truth, that it disclosed political relationships where they were unsuspected. These two forms of politicisation did not ​exclude each other, but, being of a different order, neither did they coincide. Some were classed as “outcasts” and others as “socialists.” During moments of violent reaction on the part of the authorities, these two positions were readily fused: after 1848, after the Commune, after 1940. The intellectual was rejected and persecuted at the precise moment when the facts became incontrovertible when it was forbidden to say that the emperor had no clothes. The intellectual spoke the truth to those who had yet to see it, in the name of those who were forbidden to speak the truth: he was conscience, consciousness, and eloquence. In the most recent upheaval (3) the intellectual discovered that the masses no longer need him to gain knowledge: they know perfectly well, without illusion; they know far better than he and they are certainly capable of expressing themselves. But there exists a system of power which blocks, prohibits, and invalidates this discourse and this knowledge, a power not only found in the manifest authority of censorship but one that profoundly and subtly penetrates an entire societal network. Intellectuals are themselves agents of this system of the power-the idea of their responsibility for “consciousness” and discourse forms part of the system. The intellectual’s role is no longer to place himself “somewhat ahead and to the side” in order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather, it is to struggle against the forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere of “knowledge,” “truth,” “consciousness,” and “discourse. ”
In this sense theory does not express, translate, or serve to apply practice: it is practice. But it is local and regional, as you said, and not totalising. This is a struggle for power, a struggle aimed at revealing and undermining power where it is most invisible and insidious. It is not to “awaken consciousness” that we struggle (the masses have been aware for some time that consciousness is a form of knowledge, and consciousness as the basis of subjectivity is a prerogative of the bourgeoisie), but to sap power, to take power; it is an activity conducted alongside those who struggle for power, and not their illumination from a safe distance. A “theory ” is the regional system of this struggle.

DELEUZE: Precisely. A theory is exactly like a box of tools. It has nothing to do with the signifier. It must be useful. It must function. And not for itself. If no one uses it, beginning with the theoretician himself (who then ceases to be a theoretician), then the theory is worthless or the moment is inappropriate. We don’t revise a theory, but construct new ones; we have no choice but to make others. It is strange that it was Proust, an author thought to be a pure intellectual, who said it so clearly: treat my book as a pair of glasses directed to the outside; if they don’t suit you, find another pair; I leave it to you to find your own instrument, which is necessarily an investment for combat. A theory does not totalize; it is an instrument for multiplication and it also multiplies itself. It is in the nature of power to totalise and it is your position. and one I fully agree with, that theory is by nature opposed to power. As soon as a theory is enmeshed in a particular point, we realise that it will never possess the slightest practical importance unless it can erupt in a totally different area. This is why the notion of reform is so stupid and hypocritical. Either reform are designed by people who claim to be representative, who make a profession of speaking for others, and they lead to a division of power, to a distribution of this new power which is consequently increased by a double repression; or they arise from the complaints and demands of those concerned. This latter instance is no longer a reform but revolutionary action that questions (expressing the full force of its partiality) the totality of power and the hierarchy that maintains it. This is surely evident in prisons: the smallest and most insignificant of the prisoners’ demands can puncture Pleven’s pseudo-reform (5). If the protests of children were heard in kindergarten, if their questions were attended to, it would be enough to explode the entire educational system. There is no denying that our social system is total without tolerance; this accounts for its extreme fragility in all its aspects and also its need for a global form of repression. In my opinion, you were the first-in your books and in the practical sphere-to teach us something absolutely fundamental: the indignity of speaking for others. Pe ridiculed representation and said it was finished, but we failed to draw the consequences of this “theoretical” conversion-to appreciate the theoretical fact that only those directly concerned can speak in a practical way on their own behalf.
FOUCAULT: And when the prisoners began to speak, they possessed an individual theory of prisons, the penal system, and justice. It is this form of discourse which ultimately matters, a discourse against power, the counter-discourse of prisoners and those we call delinquents and not a theory about delinquency. The problem of prisons is local and marginal: not more than 100,000 people pass through prisons in a year. In France at present, between 300,000 and 400,000 have been to prison. Yet this marginal problem seems to disturb everyone. I was surprised that so many who had not been to prison could become interested in its problems, surprised that all those who bad never heard the discourse of inmates could so easily understand them. How do we explain this? Isn’t it because, in a general way, the penal system is the form in which power is most obviously seen as power? To place someone in prison, to confine him to deprive him of food and heat, to prevent him from leaving, making love, etc.-this is certainly the most frenzied manifestation of power imaginable. The other day I was speaking to a woman who bad been in prison and she was saying: “Imagine, that at the age of forty, I was punished one day with a meal of dry bread.” What is striking about this story is not the childishness of the exercise of power but the cynicism with which power is exercised as power, in the most archaic, puerile, infantile manner. As children, we learn what it means to be reduced to bread and water. Prison is the only place where power is manifested in its naked state, in its most excessive form, and where it is justified as moral force. “I am within my rights to punish you because you know that it is criminal to rob and kill . . . … What is fascinating about prisons is that, for once, power doesn’t hide or mask itself; it reveals itself as tyranny pursued into the tiniest details; it is cynical and at the same time pure and entirely “justified,” because its practice can be totally formulated within the framework of morality. It’s brutal tyranny consequently appears as the serene domination of Good over Evil, of order over disorder.

​DELEUZE: Yes, and the reverse is equally true. Not only are prisoners treated like children, but children are treated like prisoners. Children are submitted to an infantilisation which is alien to them. On this basis, it is undeniable that schools resemble prisons and that factories are its closest approximation. Look at the entrance to a Renault plant, or anywhere else for that matter: three tickets to get into the washroom during the day. You found an eighteenth-century text by Jeremy Bentham proposing prison reforms; in the name of this exalted reform, be establishes a circular system where the renovated prison serves as a model and where the individual passes imperceptibly from school to the factory, from the factory to prison and vice versa. This is the essence of the reforming impulse, of reformed representation. On the contrary, when people begin to speak and act on their own behalf, they do not oppose their representation (even as its reversal) to another; they do not oppose a new representativity to the false representativity of power. For example, I remember your saying that there is no popular justice against justice; the reckoning takes place at another level.
​FOUCAULT: I think that it is not simply the idea of better and more equitable forms of justice that underlies the people’s hatred of the judicial system, of judges, courts, and prisons, but aside from this and before anything else the singular perception that power is always exercised at the expense of the people. The anti-judicial struggle is a struggle against power and I don’t think that it is a struggle against injustice, against the injustice of the judicial system, or a struggle for improving the efficiency of its institutions. It is particularly striking that in outbreaks of rioting and revolt or in seditious movements the judicial system has been as compelling a target as the financial structure, the army, and other forms of power. My hypothesis -but it is merely a hypothesis- is that popular courts, such as those found in the Revolution, were a means for the lower middle class, who were allied with the masses, to salvage and recapture the initiative in the struggle against the judicial system. To achieve this, they proposed a court system based on the possibility of equitable justice, where a judge might render a just verdict. The identifiable form of the court of law belongs to the bourgeois ideology of justice.
DELEUZE: On the basis of our actual situation, power emphatically develops a total or global vision. That is, all the current forms of repression (the racist repression of immigrant workers, repression in the factories, in the educational system, and the general repression of youth) are easily totalised from the point of view of power. We should not only seek the unity of these forms in the reaction to May ’68 but more appropriately, in the concerted preparation and organisation of the near future, French capitalism now relies on a “margin” of unemployment and has abandoned the liberal and paternal mask that promised full employment. In this perspective, we begin to see the unity of the forms of repression: restrictions on immigration, once it is acknowledged that the most difficult and thankless jobs go to immigrant workers-repression in the factories, because the French must reacquire the “taste” for increasingly harder work; the struggle against youth and the repression of the educational system, because police repression is more active when there is less need for young people in the work force. A wide range of professionals (teachers, psychiatrists, educators of all kinds, etc.) will be called upon to exercise functions that have traditionally belonged to the police. This is something you predicted long ago, and it was thought impossible at the time: the reinforcement of all the structures of confinement. Against this global policy of power, we initiate localised counter-responses, skirmishes, active and occasionally preventive defences. We have no need to totalise that which is invariably totalized on the side of power; if we were to move in this direction, it would mean restoring the representative forms of centralism and a hierarchical structure. We must set up lateral affiliations and an entire system of the net- works and popular bases, and this is especially difficult. In any case, we no longer define reality as a continuation of politics in the traditional sense of competition and the distribution of power, through the so-called representative agencies of the Communist Party or the General Workers Union(6). The reality is what actually happens in factories, in schools, in barracks, in prisons, in police stations. And this action carries a type of information which is altogether different from that found in newspapers (this explains the kind of information carried by the Agence de Press Liberation (7)

FOUCAULT: Isn’t this difficulty of finding adequate forms of struggle a result of the fact that we continue to ignore the problem of power? After all, we had to wait until the nineteenth century before we began to understand the nature of exploitation, and to this day, we have yet to fully comprehend the nature of power. It may be that Marx and Freud cannot satisfy our desire for understanding this enigmatic thing which we call power, which is at once visible and invisible, present and hidden, ubiquitous. Theories of government and the traditional analyses of their mechanisms certainly don’t exhaust the field where power is exercised and where it functions. The question of power re- mains a total enigma. Who exercises power? And in what sphere? We now know with reasonable certainty who exploits others, who receives the profits, which people are involved, and we know how these funds are reinvested. But as for power . . . We know that it is not in the hands of those who govern. But, of course, the idea of the “ruling class” has never received an adequate formulation, and neither have other terms, such as “to dominate … .. to rule … .. to govern,” etc. These notions are far too fluid and require analysis. We should also investigate the limits imposed on the exercise of power the relays through which it operates and the extent of its influence on the often insignificant aspects of the hierarchy and the forms of control, surveillance, prohibition, and constraint. Everywhere that power exists, it is being exercised. No one, strictly speaking, has an official right to power; and yet it is always excited in a particular direction, with some people on one side and some on the other. It is often difficult to say who holds power in a precise sense, but it is easy to see who lacks power. If the reading of your books (from Nietzsche to what I anticipate in Capitalism and Schizophrenia (8) has been essential for me, it is because they seem to go very far in exploring this problem: under the ancient theme of meaning, of the signifier and the signified, etc., you have developed the question of power, of the inequality of powers and their struggles. Each struggle develops around a particular source of power (any of the countless, tiny sources- a small-time boss, the manager of “H.L.M.,”‘ a prison warden, a judge, a union representative, the editor-in-chief of a newspaper). And if pointing out these sources-denouncing and speaking out is to be a part of the struggle, it is not because they were previously unknown. Rather, it is because to speak on this subject, to force the institutionalised networks of information to listen, to produce names, to point the finger of accusation, to find targets, is the first step in the reversal of power and the initiation of new struggles against existing forms of power. if the discourse of inmates or prison doctors constitutes a form of struggle, it is because they confiscate, at least temporarily, the power to speak on prison conditions at present, the exclusive property of prison administrators and their cronies in reform groups. The discourse of struggle is not opposed to the unconscious, but to the secretive. It may not seem like much; but what if it turned out to be more than we expected? A whole series of misunderstandings relates to things that are “hidden,” “repressed,” and “unsaid”; and they permit the cheap “psychoanalysis” of the proper objects of struggle. It is perhaps more difficult to unearth a secret than the unconscious. The two themes frequently encountered in the recent past, that “writing gives rise to repressed elements” and that “writing is necessarily a subversive activity,” seem to betray a number of operations that deserve to be severely denounced.
DELEUZE: With respect to the problem you posed: it is clear who exploits, who profits, and who governs, but power nevertheless remains something more diffuse. I would venture the following hypothesis: the thrust of Marxism was to define the problem essentially in terms of interests (power is held by a ruling class defined by its interests). The ​the question immediately arises: how is it that people whose interests are not being served can strictly support the existing power structure by demanding a piece of the action? Perhaps, this is because, in terms of investments, whether economic or unconscious, interest is not the final answer; there are investments of desire that function in a more profound and diffuse manner than our interests dictate. But of course, we never desire against our interests, because interest always follows and finds itself where desire has placed it. We cannot shut out the scream of Reich: the masses were not deceived; at a particular time, they actually wanted a fascist regime! There are investments of desire that mould and distribute power, that make it the property of the policeman as much as of the prime minister; in this context, there is no qualitative difference between the power wielded by the policeman and the prime minister. The nature of these investments of desire in a social group explains why political parties or unions, which might have or should have revolutionary investments in the name of class interests, are so often reform-oriented or absolutely reactionary on the level of desire.

FOUCAULT: As you say, the relationship between desire, power, and interest are more complex than we ordinarily think, and it is not necessarily those who exercise power who have an interest in its execution; nor is it always possible for those with vested interests to exercise power. Moreover, the desire for power establishes a singular relationship between power and interest. It may happen that the masses, during fascist periods, desire that certain people assume power, people with whom they are unable to identify since these individuals exert power against the masses and at their expense, to the extreme of their death, their sacrifice, their massacre. Nevertheless, they desire this particular power; they want it to be exercised. This play of desire, power, and interest has received very little attention. It was a long time before we began to understand exploitation, and desire has had and continues to have a long history. It is possible that the struggles now taking place and the local, regional, and discontinuous theories that derive from these struggles and that are indissociable from them stand at the threshold of our discovery of the manner in which power is exercised.
DELEUZE: In this context, I must return to the question: the present revolutionary movement has created multiple centres, and not as the result of weakness or insufficiency since a certain kind of totalization pertains to power and the forces of reaction. (Vietnam, for instance, is an impressive example of localised counter-tactics). But bow are we to define the networks, the transversal links between these active and discontinuous points, from one country to another or within a single country?

​FOUCAULT: The question of geographical discontinuity which you raise might mean the following: as soon as we struggle against exploitation, the proletariat not only leads the struggle but also defines its targets, its methods, and the places and instruments for confrontation; and to ally oneself with the proletariat is to accept its positions, its ideology, and its motives for combat. This means total identification. But if the fight is directed against power, then all those on whom power is exercised to their detriment, all who find it intolerable, can begin the struggle on their own terrain and on the basis of their proper activity (or passivity). In engaging in a struggle that concerns their own interests, whose objectives they clearly understand and whose methods only they can determine, they enter into a revolutionary process. They naturally enter as allies of the proletariat, because power is exercised the way it is in order to maintain capitalist exploitation. They genuinely serve the cause of the proletariat by fighting in those places they find themselves oppressed. Women, prisoners, conscripted soldiers, hospital patients, and homosexuals have now begun a specific struggle against the particularised power, the constraints and controls, that are exerted over them. Such struggles are actually involved in the revolutionary movement to the degree that they are radical, uncompromising and no reformist, and refuse any attempt at arriving at a new disposition of the same power with, at best, a change of masters. And these movements are linked to the revolutionary movement of the proletariat to the extent that they fight against the controls and constraints which serve the same system of power.
​In this sense, the overall picture presented by the struggle is certainly not that of the totalization you mentioned earlier,this theoretical totalization under the guise of “truth.” The generality of the struggle specifically derives from the system of power itself, from all the forms in which power is exercised and applied.
​DELEUZE: And which we are unable to approach in any of its applications without revealing its diffuse character, so that we are necessarily led–on the basis of the most insignificant demand to the desire to blow it up completely. Every revolutionary attack or defence, however partial, is linked in this way to the workers’ struggle.
This discussion was recorded March 4, 1972; and it was published in a special issue of L’Arc (No. 49, pp. 3-10), dedicated to Gilles Deleuze. It is reprinted here by permission of L’Arc. (All footnotes supplied by the editor).
1. “Groupe information de prisons”: Foucault’s two most recent publications (I, Pierre Riviere and Surveiller et Punir)result from this association.
2. Cf. above “Theatrum Philosophicum,” p. 185 in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice.
3. May 1968, popularly known as the “events of May.”
4. See L’Ordre du discourse, pp. 47-53 in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice.
5, Rene Pleven was the prime minister of France in the early 1950.
6. “Confederation Generale de Travailleurs”, General Confederation of Workers.
7. Liberation News Agency.
8. Nietzsche et la Philosophie (Paris: P.U.F., 1962) and Capitalisme et schizophrenia, vol. 1, ‘Anti-Oedipus, in collaboration with F. Guattari (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1912). Both books are now available in English.
9. Habitations à Loyer Modéré – moderate rental housing.”

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April 2017
March 2017
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK – ‘IS THERE A POST-HUMAN GOD?’
J.G. BALLARD – RUSHING TO PARADISE
MICHEL FOUCAULT AND GILLES DELEUZE – INTELLECTUALS AND POWER
FELIX GUATTARI – EVERYBODY WANTS TO BE A FASCIST (PART1)
FELIX GUATTARI – EVERYBODY WANTS TO BE A FASCIST (PART2)
FELIX GUATTARI – EVERYBODY WANTS TO BE A FASCIST (PART3)
FELIX GUATTARI – EVERYBODY WANTS TO BE A FASCIST (PART4)
FELIX GUATTARI – EVERYBODY WANTS TO BE A FASCIST (DISCUSSION)
GILLES DELEUZE – D AS IN DESIRE
FELIX GUATTARI – ‘SO WHAT’
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI – HOW DO YOU MAKE YOURSELF A ‘BODY WITHOUT ORGANS’?
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI – DESIRING-PRODUCTION
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI – THE BODY WITHOUT ORGANS
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI – IMMANENCE AND DESIRE
GILLES DELEUZE – THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE WILL
GILLES DELEUZE – DIONYSUS AND ZARATHUSTRA
GILLES DELEUZE – CHARACTERISTICS OF RESSENTIMENT
GILLES DELEUZE – IS HE GOOD ? IS HE EVIL
GILLES DELEUZE – THE DICETHROW
GILLES DELEUZE – POSTSCRIPT ON THE SOCIETIES OF CONTROL
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI – MEMORIES OF A SORCERER
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI – MEMORIES AND BECOMINGS, POINTS AND BLOCKS
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI – FEAR, CLARITY, POWER AND DEATH
DELEUZE AND GUATTARI – MEMORIES OF A HAECCEITY
ACCELERATE MANIFESTO
MCKENZIE WARK – BLACK ACCELERATIONISM
MCKENZIE WARK – ERIK OLIN WRIGHT AND CLASS TODAY
STEVEN CRAIG HICKMAN – NIKLAS LUHMANN: MASS-MEDIA, COMMUNICATIONS, AND PARANOIA
REZA NEGARESTANI – WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? PART 1: AXIOMS AND PROGRAMS
REZA NEGARESTANI – WHAT IS PHILOSOPHY? PART 2: PROGRAMS AND REALIZABILITIES
HENRY BERGSON – ONE OF THE MOST FAMOUS AND INFLUENTIAL FRENCH PHILOSOPHERS
PAUL VIRILIO – THE VISION MACHINE ( PART 1)
JASNA KOTESKA – KAFKA, HUMORIST (PART 1)
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The Theory and Practice of ‘Theory and Practice’

The Theory and Practice of ‘Theory and Practice’ in Art and Design HE

http://events.arts.ac.uk/event/2017/5/17/The-Theory-and-Practice-of-Theory-and-Practice-in-Art-and-Design-HE/

1C66B217-4136-407D-B2C5-C542C49F5AD1-3960-0000056061B934C6

17 May 2017
9.30am to 4.30pm

Overview
This teaching platform will look beyond the simple binaries between theory and practice and put into focus the evolving pedagogical relationships between these two different yet intertwined disciplines.

It seeks to be inclusive of current theories and practices that relate theory and practice. It aims to question contemporary theories and practices, which support ‘theory and practice’ in Art and Design undergraduate courses in the UK.

The conference will consider the long and complex history of the ways in which theory and practice has been taught on arts undergraduate courses in the UK. From the Coldstream Reports in 1969/70 with the introduction of Art History and Complementary studies on an undergraduate degree in Art and Design and the subsequent developments in Critical Theory, Cultural Studies, Complimentary and Contextual Studies.

As Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1990 p2) argues, “Since practice is an irreducible theoretical moment, no practice takes place without presupposing itself as a example of a more or less powerful theory,” then can we now see the possibility of there being no difference between theory and practice being the future of the pedagogies of theory and practice in UK undergraduate courses?

The conference will reflect on how different writing practices support the relationships between theory and practice in contemporary Arts education. As this education, now contextualised within the massification of the University sector, involves preparing students for the world beyond university, we ask how can these writing practices support this preparation?

What will I learn?
This teaching platform will offer an opportunity for art and design educators to explore some of the historical and evolving relationships that theory has with practice and practice has with theory.

Themes covered by the day will include: writing practices; the possibilities of being no difference between theory and practice; the future of the relationships between theory and practice in UK undergraduate courses; curriculum models and pedagogies that most effectively support the integration of theory and practice.

Who should attend?
This event is open to academics, technicians, support tutors and librarians who have an interest in the relationships between practice and theory.

Spivak, G. C., Harasym, S. (ed) (1990) The Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues. Routledge. New York & London
Draft Programme (subject to change)
0930-1000 Registration and Coffee
1000-1010 Introductions – Prof Susan Orr, David Webster
1010-1110 Workshop with Dr Mark Ingham
1110-1130 Refreshments and Networking
1130-1220 Keynote with Dr Julia Lockheart
1230-1320 Lunch
1320-1420 Roundtable discussion
1420-1500 Degrees of Separation – Student Presentation & workshop
1500-1530 Refreshments
1530-1615 Future Theory:
Craig Burston
Katharine Dwyer
1615-1630 Plenary

Speaker Biographies

Craig Burston is Course Leader on BA (Hons) Graphic and Media Design at London College of Communication. His teaching emphasis focuses on the practical testing and application of semiotic theory, the interplay between analogue and digital media and the impact of new technologies upon aesthetics. Craig’s ongoing practice based research explores the relationship between iconic representation, memory and communication and has manifested itself through a range of output including audio-visual collaborations, gallery installations, research seminars and comic strips. With photographer and digital media artist Richard Tomlinson, Craig is also the co-founder of skip-rat designs, latterly skipratmedia. Twitter: @skipratmedia

Katharine Dwyer spent a decade working in a corporate environment before returning to study Fine Art at UAL. Katharine completed her Master of Fine Art (MFA) at Wimbledon College of Arts in 2016. Her art pratice explores languages of authority, both personal and institutional, which are used to manufacture consent in the modern workplace. Twitter @tumble33

Dr. Mark Ingham is the Contextual and Theoretical Studies Coordinator at London College of Communication. Mark is a fine artist who uses old SLR film cameras and LED lights to create multiple slide projectors in large scale art installations. His art and design research includes, relationships between autobiographical memory and photography, Gilles Deleuze’s and Felix Guattari’s ideas of ‘Becoming Rhizomatic’. His pedagogical research into the relationships between theory and practice and their roles in art and design disciplines has made him acutely aware of the importance of an holistic approach to teaching. He used his knowledge of making and doing skills, including design and multimedia software, in combination with his practical and theoretical knowledge to give students a full and rounded educational experience. Twitter: @malarkeypalaver

Dr Julia Lockheart is the director of the Writing-PAD project and co-editor, with Professor John Wood, of the Journal of Writing in Creative Practice. She has studied both Fine Art and TESOL to MA level and is also qualified to teach adults with SpLDs (Dyslexia). Julia has a PhD in Design from Goldsmiths, University of London. Her research focussed on developing tools for co-writing in design teams. She has presented and published both nationally and internationally. Twitter: @jollyjewels

Prof Susan Orr is Dean: Learning, Teaching and Enhancement at University of the Arts London. Susan has written extensively on the subject of art and design assessment and her more recent work explores various aspects of art and design pedagogy in higher education. Susan is editor for the journal Art, Design and Communication in Higher Education, and on the editorial board of three further journals. Susan is on the Executive of CHEAD (Council for Higher Education in Art and Design) and GLAD (Group for Learning in Art and Design). In 2010, Susan was awarded a Higher Education Academy National Teaching Fellowship. This was awarded in recognition of her teaching, leadership, research and contribution to art and design HE pedagogy. Twitter: @Susan_K_Orr

David Webster is Associate Dean: Learning, Teaching and Enhancement for Camberwell, Chelsea and Wimbledon Colleges at University of the Arts London.
Twitter @webster858

Teaching Platform Series
This event is part of a series hosted by University of the Arts London, exploring key issues in Arts teaching and learning in higher education. Each event includes leading speakers sharing current thinking in creative education and is designed to be interactive: delegates will have opportunities to engage in activities to support networking and engagement.

For more information about Teaching and Learning at UAL visit the Exchange website. To subscribe to our mailing list for more details about these and other events, please email teachingexchange@arts.ac.uk, or follow us on Twitter @UALTLE.